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The United States continues to develop and deploy the best weapons systems in 
the world. However, these acquisition programs are often founded on poor business 
cases. Development of new acquisition programs based on poor business cases continue 
because there are strong incentives within the acquisition community to make promises 
regarding a weapon’s systems performance that cannot be kept while underestimating 
cost and schedule demands. This causes programs to take longer than originally planned, 
cost significantly more, and deliver fewer functional units and capabilities than originally 
planned. As a result, our soldiers use equipment with less capability than intended, 
weapons perform but perhaps not to the level planned, and support costs exceed 
acceptable levels over the life time of the system. 
This proposal outlines two policies designed to incentivize the defense acquisition 
workforce and upper echelons of Pentagon leadership to push programs based on good 
business models and reasonable cost estimates rather than the current status quo. The first 
proposal, an expansion of the Superior Supplier Incentive Program, would add better 
incentives to the existing program and create restrictions on which companies could bid 
on the largest contracts based on their ranking within the program. The second proposal, 
amendments to the Nunn-McCurdy Act, is designed to create better accountability for 
program decisions in the highest levels of Pentagon leadership and provide Congress with 
additional oversight opportunities on programs that incur a Nunn-McCurdy breach. 
This policy proposal set out to fix an enormously broad and complicated problem: 
eliminate systemic issues that incentivize overly optimistic cost estimates to be made on 
bad business models. While the proposal contains many strengths, such as a low cost 
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incentive program that contractors are already on board with and forcing Congress to 
reconsider the largest cost overruns, these strengths appear to be overshadowed by 
weaknesses that have occurred as a result of an overly simplistic expansion of a program, 
and Congress’s own systemic issues. As a result, the policy proposal is not 
recommended. 
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TO: Congressman Adam Smith 
        Ranking Member, House Armed Services Committee 
FROM: Justin Brower 
   Military Legislative Assistant 
DATE: 4/18/2016 
SUBJECT: Defense Acquisition Reform Policy Analysis 
 
Action Forcing Event 
 
 On February 3rd, 2016, Congressman Mac Thornberry, Chairman of the House 
Armed Services Committee, announced the intention of his committee to introduce 
legislation that would continue the efforts started in 2015 to bring reform to the defense 
acquisition process.1 The Chairman has indicated that this legislation would not only seek 
to add agility to the acquisition process, but also to enact Nunn-McCurdy type penalties 
for those programs whose sustainment costs exceed a certain threshold.2 
Statement of the Problem 
 
 The United States continues to develop and deploy the best weapons systems in 
the world.3 However, these acquisition programs are often founded on poor business 
cases. Development of new acquisition programs based on poor business cases continue 
because there are strong incentives within the acquisition community to make promises 
regarding a weapon’s systems performance that cannot be kept while underestimating 
cost and schedule demands.4 This causes programs to take longer than originally planned, 
                                                          
1 Joe Gould. "Thornberry to Introduce Acquisition Reform Bill." Defense News. February 4, 2016. 
Accessed February 04, 2016. http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-
budget/budget/2016/02/03/thornberry-introduce-acquisition-reform-bill/79775024/. 
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cost significantly more, and deliver fewer functional units and capabilities than originally 
planned. As a result, our soldiers use equipment with less capability than intended, 
weapons perform but perhaps not to the level planned, and support costs exceed 
acceptable levels over the life time of the system.5 
 From 2014 to 2015, the size of the major acquisition program portfolio for the 
Department of Defense (DOD) decreased from 80 programs to 78, while the estimated 
cost has decreased by $7.6 billion, bringing the program to its smallest size and lowest 
cost in a decade.6 However, these cost decreases were in fact driven by significant 
quantity reductions in only two programs. According to the Government Accountability 
Office, most programs within the DOD’s acquisition portfolio actually experienced a cost 
increase over this time period, and the average time to deliver initial capabilities to the 
warfighter increased by over a month. Indeed, forty programs within the portfolio 
actually lost buying power according to the same GAO assessment, resulting in $2.2 
Billion in additional costs.7 It is not unusual to find that time requirements and financial 
needs for programs have been underestimated by between 20 and 50 percent. When 
considering the fact that the DOD is currently investing $1.4 trillion to acquire these 
weapons systems, cost increase of that scope have impressive effects.8 
 However, the DOD is not the sole subject for blame in the case of these cost 
overruns, as Congress has consistently shown a willingness to authorize and appropriate 
funding for programs that are based on unsound business cases and not ready to move 
                                                          
5 Ibid. 
6 Dodaro, Gene L. "Defense Acquisitions: Assessment of Selected Weapons Programs." Government 







forward. These unsound business cases frequently involve projects that will require 
technologies or manufacturing methods that are not mature. In 2007, GAO officials 
testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on the new Ford Class 
Aircraft Carrier.9 They reported that construction costs were potentially underestimated 
by at least 22 percent and that critical technologies required by the platform were not 
fully matured. Despite these warnings regarding the carrier’s business case, Congress 
approved funding. Seven years later, technology maturity has been delayed nearly five 
years, and the program is now behind schedule.10 
 A discussion of bad business cases due to immature technology development that 
have been funded despite these problems would be incomplete without mentioning the F-
35 Lightning II Program. Despite having been in development for 15 years, the aircraft 
prognostic and health management system is still considered immature, and the program 
continues to experience changes. Additionally, while manufacturing efforts have 
remained steady, less than 40 percent of the critical manufacturing processes required to 
construct the aircraft remain immature as well. Indeed, the F-35 is the epitome of lost 
buying power in the DOD acquisition portfolio, as the program lost buying power in the 
previous year, despite no change in the procured quantity. The DOD is literally paying 
more for the same amount of capability.11 
 Finally, due to systems acquired under poor business cases, and systems that have 
been kept operational past their expected time frame, the operations and support costs of 
                                                          
9 Francis, Paul L. "FORD CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIER: Poor Outcomes Are the Predictable 
Consequences of the Prevalent Acquisition Culture." Government Accountability Office, October 1, 2015, 
1-22. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-84T. 
10 Ibid. 
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systems have started to have an even larger effect on the bottom line of the DOD. While 
much attention is paid to the development and production costs of these systems, it is 
important to remember that the operations and support costs for systems make up nearly 
50% of their overall life time cost.12 As former Pentagon Comptroller Robert Hale stated 
when he testified before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) in February, 
sustainment costs have risen over 20 percent since 2000. 
History 
Since World War II, every Presidential Administration and nearly every Secretary 
of Defense have made efforts to institute acquisition reform in the defense community. In 
fact, more than 150 studies on defense acquisition reform have been performed since the 
end of the 1940s.13 However, this historical background on the efforts to institute defense 
acquisition reform will focus on the thread of major reforms beginning in the 1980s and 
stretching until the Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act. 
The most recent thread of efforts to combat growing costs and schedule delays that have 
become common place in the national defense acquisition system began under the 
administration of President Ronald Reagan. During that time, multiple major weapon 
systems experienced dramatic cost overruns that increased the budget of the defense 
department by billions of dollars. These systems included the Patriot missile system (37% 
cost growth), the Hellfire missile (48% cost growth), the Blackhawk helicopter (24% cost 
growth), and the F-18 Horney (21% growth). A Selected Acquisition Report from 1980 
                                                          
12  
13 Moshe Schwartz. "Defense Acquisition Reform: Background, Analysis, and Issues for 
Congress." Congressional Research Service, May 23, 2014, 1-29. Accessed February 10, 2016. 




indicated that there was a $47 Billion cost increase for 47 major weapon systems in the 
last three months of 1980 alone.14 
This out of control cost growth spurred the creation of the Nunn-McCurdy Act of 
1982. Included as an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act of 1982, 
Nunn-McCurdy requires the Department of Defense to inform Congress when a Major 
Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) violates certain cost thresholds. The legislation 
stipulates that a program can be held in either a significant or critical breach of Nunn-
McCurdy act. A breach is significant if the program is 15% or more over the current 
baseline or 30% or more over the original baseline, and a program is said to be in a 
critical breach if it is 25% or more over the current baseline or 50% over the original 
baseline.15 While these metrics may seem stringent, they can be bypassed by the 
Secretary of Defense if a detailed explanation is sent to Congress that certifies that the 
program is essential the national security, that new estimates of program costs are 
reasonable, and that the management structure is adequate to control costs. While in 1997 
there was only one Nunn-McCurdy breach, there were 77 between 1998 and 2009.16 
In 1985, President Reagan created the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on 
Defense Management, chaired by former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard. 
The report issued by the commission would become known as the Packard Commission 
Report. Additionally, in 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry created a proposal for 
another round of defense acquisition reforms in a document entitled Acquisition Reform: 
                                                          
14 Schwartz, Moshe. "Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here?" 
Congressional Research Service, October 29, 2013, 1-24. Accessed February 16, 2016. 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20131029/101414/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-SchwartzM-
20131029.pdf. 
15 Schwartz, Moshe. "The Nunn-McCurdy Act: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress." 






A Mandate for Change. While neither of these reports held any legal authority, many of 
their proposals would be incorporated in the efforts of the Legislative branch in the 1990s 
to deal with defense acquisition.17 
In fact, some of the recommendations made in the Packard Commission report 
formed the basis for the next major legislative attempt to institute defense acquisition 
reform. While many people inside the DoD had pointed out for many years that a highly 
trained and skilled defense acquisition workforce could have a major positive impact on 
the defense acquisition system, no attempts had been made to improve the quality of the 
workforce. As David Packard wrote in the Packard Commission’s final report to 
President Reagan, “excellence in defense management cannot be achieves by the 
numerous management layers, large staffs, and countless regulations in place today. It 
depends on reducing all of these by adhering closely to basic, common sense principles: 
giving a few capable people the authority and responsibility to do their job, maintaining 
short lines of communication, and holding people accountable for results.”18 Deputy 
Secretary Packard’s thoughts struck a chord in Congress as well. 
In 1990, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) was 
included in the FY 1991 National Defense Authorization Act.19 DAWIA required the 
DoD to establish a process through which persons in the acquisition workforce would be 
recognized as having achieved professional certifications in the field of defense 
acquisitions. These certifications have become the procedure through which the various 
                                                          
17 Moshe Schwartz. "Defense Acquisition Reform: Background, Analysis, and Issues for 
Congress." Congressional Research Service, May 23, 2014, 1-29. Accessed February 10, 2016. 
Congressional Research Service. 
18 A Quest for Excellence, Final Report to the President by the Blue Ribbon Commission of Defense 
Management, June 30, 1986. 




branches of the armed services and or DoD component agencies ensure that an employee 
has met the educational, training, and experience standards that are required for a career 
in the field of acquisition, technology, and logistics field. These certifications and the 
process through which they are run became known as Defense Acquisition University.20 
While the centralization of training has been effective at least in terms of ensuring more 
people have been trained in the best practices of defense acquisition, it is unclear that 
DAWIA has been as effective as originally hoped. Several analysts have indicated that 
this may be the result of DAWIA’s failure to address the culture and incentive structure 
of those employed by the national security defense acquisition system.21 
The next chapter in defense acquisition reform would not take place until 2009. 
While previous attempts at major changes to the defense acquisition reform system 
utilized the yearly National Defense Authorization Act as a vehicle, the “Weapon System 
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009” was passed in the faceof reports of rising costs and 
overages for the majority of the Pentagon’s weapons systems. In 2008, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) reported that nearly 70% of the Pentagon’s 96 biggest 
weapon systems were over budget. Additionally, a separate report detailed $295 billion in 
waste and cost overruns in defense contract spending. In light of these figures, the 
Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 was introduced on February 23,    
2009, and subsequently passed both the House and Senate unanimously.22 President 
Obama subsequently signed the bill into law on May 22, 2009.23 
                                                          
20 "DAWIA Certification." DOD Dacm. Accessed February 18, 2016. 
http://www.dau.mil/doddacm/Pages/Certification.aspx. 
21 J. Ronald Fox. Defense Acquisition Reform 1960-2009: An Elusive Goal. CreateSpace Independent 
Publishing Platform. December 11, 2014. 
22 "S.454 - Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, a Bill on OpenCongress." OpenCongress. 




The Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 took a more focused 
approach to defense acquisition reform than previous efforts had attempted, this facet of 
the defense acquisition process had been specifically selected after congressional 
hearings, investigations, and a set of extensive consultations with the defense 
department.24 Rather than focusing on the broad scope of defense acquisition reform, this 
legislation focused exclusively on improving the earliest stages of weapon system 
development by attempting to promote better cost estimates and testing in an attempt to 
prevent cost over runs from ever occurring. .  
The changes made by the 2009 legislation were numerous and important. First 
and foremost was the appointment of a Director of Cost Assessment and Program 
Evaluation, a figure now known as the CAPE. Previously known as the Office of 
Program Analysis & Evaluation (PA&E), the CAPE was given the responsibility of 
issuing guidance and policies on cost estimating, specifically, ways in which cost 
estimates could be made more trustworthy. The CAPE, while working directly with the 
Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense, issues policies and establishes 
guidance on cost estimating while developing confidence levels for these estimates.25 
Second, a Director of Developmental Test and Evaluation (DDTE) position was 
established. The DDTE serves as the main advisor to the Secretary of Defense on 
developmental test and evaluation. They also develop the policies and guidance for 
conducting developmental testing and evaluation, while also reviewing, approving, and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
23 Alexander, David. "Obama Signs Law to Reform Pentagon Weapons Buying." Reuters. 2009. Accessed 
February 18, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-obama-pentagon-idUSTRE54L3FR20090522. 
24 Moshe Schwartz. "Defense Acquisition Reform: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress." 
Congressional Research Service, May 23, 2014, 1-29. Accessed February 10, 2016. Congressional 
Research Service. 
25 Schwartz, Moshe. "Defense Acquisitions: How DOD Acquires Weapon Systems."Congressional 





monitoring this testing for each Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP).26 Third, 
the appointment of a Director of Systems Engineering (DSE) is required. DSE advises the 
Secretary of Defense on systems engineering and who should develop policies and 
guidance for the use of such systems engineering. He or she also reviews, approves, and 
monitors this testing for each MDAP.27 Fourth, the Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering is now required to periodically address the technical maturity of MDAPS 
and annually report findings to Congress.28 Fifth, the Nunn-McCurdy Act, previously 
mentioned in the memorandum, was revised to require any program found in critical 
breach to have its most recent development milestone revoked.29 While this summary 
does not include every major change, these five provisions served as the landmark 
changes to the defense acquisition system. Given the relatively recent passage of the 
legislation, analysts remain unclear on its efficacy.30 
The final and most recent chapter of the mission to accomplish meaningful 
defense acquisition reform occurred in 2015. The FY16 NDAA reforms, which were 
primarily spearheaded by Senator John McCain, were designed to provide the individual 
armed service chiefs with additional power and responsibilities in the earliest phases of 
                                                          
26 Schwartz, Moshe. "Twenty-Five Years of Defense Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here?" 
Congressional Research Service, October 29, 2013, 1-24. 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20131029/101414/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-SchwartzM-
20131029.pdf. 
27 27 Moshe Schwartz. "Defense Acquisition Reform: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress." 
Congressional Research Service, May 23, 2014, 1-29. Accessed February 10, 2016. Congressional 
Research Service. 
28   Schwartz, Moshe. "Defense Acquisitions: How DOD Acquires Weapon Systems."Congressional 
Research Service, March 23, 2014, 1-21. Accessed February 18, 2016. 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34026.pdf. 
29 Ibid 
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the defense acquisition process.31 In fact, under the new legislation, the service chiefs and 
secretaries will be responsible for determining requirements for new programs and for 
monitoring technical and cost issues before allowing programs to advance.32 This is a 
major structural shift for the defense department, where the Office of the Undersecretary 
of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics (AT&L) had held this authority for 
thirty years.33 Additionally, service chiefs will be punished for programs that perform 
poorly. In the event of a Nunn-McCurdy type breach, the services will be required to pay 
a three percent penalty fee into an account that will be designed to fund rapid 
prototyping. That program would also revert to defense department supervision until the 
program is on track again.34 Additionally, in order to deal with what is considered a 
sluggish acquisition cycle, new protocols are being developed in order to ensure that 
weapons systems are being fielded rapidly. This new “middle tier” of acquisition is 
designed to ensure that weapons systems will be able to reach the battlefield within two 
to five years. It is also designed to move the defense department to what is referred to as 
a “spiral development cycle.” This new methodology is characterized by quickly fielded 
programs, upgrades, and refielding, so that programs are constantly updated. These new 
changes to the defense acquisition system will not take place until calendar year 2017.35  
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 As is made clear by the brief history of defense acquisition reform above, there 
have been a variety of efforts to improve the processes by which acquisition decisions are 
made, and some effort to improve the education and training of the defense acquisition 
workforce. However, there have been no efforts in almost three decades to address the 
aspects of the defense acquisition system that incentivize the bad behaviors which have 
led to a workforce culture that promotes moving forward on bad business models. As 
Paul Francis, Managing Director for Acquisition and Sourcing Management for the 
United States Government Accountability Office said to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee during a hearing on the Ford Class Aircraft Carrier, “Where do we go from 
here? Under consideration this year are a number of acquisition reforms [referring to 
ideas that would be incorporated in the FY16 NDAA]. While these aim to change the 
policies that govern weapon system acquisition, they do not sufficiently address the 
incentives that drive the behavior. As I described above, the acquisition culture in general 
rewards programs for moving forward with unrealistic business cases.”36 
Incentives for The Defense Acquisition Workforce to Promote Bad Business Models 
 It is not unreasonable to assume that some of the undesirable outcomes in the 
defense acquisitions process are due to unforeseen obstacles and honest mistakes 
amongst other complicating factors. However, as David Packard, the former Deputy 
Secretary of Defense who led the Packard Commission is quoted as having once said, 
“We all know what needs to be done. The question is, why aren’t we doing it?” The “it,” 
                                                          





in this case, is the process of ensuring that programs that move forward through the 
defense acquisition system are based upon good business cases. The reason why this 
frequently does not happen is because there are three behaviors incentivized in the 
defense acquisition system that promote bad business models. 
 The first incentivized behavior that promotes the defense acquisition workforce to 
promote programs based on bad business models work is that of over promising results. 
The defense acquisition system, especially when it comes to weapon systems 
acquisitions, tends to reward programs for moving forward with bad business cases. Over 
promising is incentivized for two reasons.37 
1) The Timing of Return on Investment 
First, the defense acquisition system shares some similarities with the 
commercial marketplace, but differs in important ways as well. While 
investment in a new product in the commercial world and in the defense 
department is an expense, the critical difference is when the return on 
investment will occur. In the commercial world, the investment is not 
recouped until the product is developed, produced, and sold. On the other 
hand, in the defense acquisition world, new products represent revenue, 
because a program’s return on investment occurs as soon as a funding 
decision, such as the passage of an appropriations bill, occurs.38  
2) Competing for the same funding.  
 Because the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines compete for the same, limited 
pool of funding, they are incentivized to over promise on performance. These 
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promises are frequently made on the back of immature technologies, while 
promising low cost and a short delivery time. Not only do these programs 
compete for much of the same funding, but the suppliers are competing for the 
business of the only buyer, the defense department. As such, undue optimism 
regarding rapid development and high performance are incentivized due to hyper 
competition and the ease with which expenses can be recouped.  
These two issues incentivize the behavior of overly optimistic cost estimates, 
which lead to a workforce that feels encouraged to push programs based on bad business 
models ever forward.39  
The second systemic issue that causes bad behaviors that move programs based 
on bad business models forward is one that is inextricably intertwined into the defense 
acquisition process: the budget cycle.   Because budget requests, congressional 
authorizations, and congressional appropriations are made one timelines occurring well 
before the start of any program, it is possible that needed information, such as that related 
to cost, technical challenges, or theoretical schedule, that may be needed in order to make 
an educated decision on whether or not to move a program forward is simply unavailable. 
This data gap creates, once again, an opportunity for optimism and unrealistic 
expectations to become involved in the approval process.40 
For example, consider a program that would start hypothetically in August of 
2017. This program would need to be included in the Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request 
that the President submits to Congress. This submission would need to occur by in 
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February of 2016. This submission then occurs a full eighteen months before the program 
decision review, let alone any milestone decisions, have been reached. It is a distinct 
possibility that information relating to technological maturity or manufacturing practices, 
both of which are crucial to successful program execution, may not be finalized. With 
money already budgeted for a program, and with program managers who are specifically 
employed to move their programs to the next milestone, an immense amount of pressure 
exists to spend the money that has already been allocated for a program.  
The budget cycle has left an indelible mark on the defense acquisition process. 
What essentially amounts to a prefunding mechanism, that is, the fact that budgets for 
programs are appropriated months and years before start dates, incentivizes program 
sponsors and other actors to once again place an undue amount of optimism in their 
programs for fear of missing deadlines and of funds being reprogrammed to other sources 
in the highly competitive acquisition system.41 
The final cultural issue that incentivizes bad business models is simple: Congress 
continues to approve them. As Congress continues to approve funds for programs that fail 
to meet deadlines and performance requirements, it is continuously signaling its approval 
of these incentives. The authorization of programs and the appropriation of their funding 
is the most powerful oversight tool that Congress has in its arsenal.42  
However, Congress has failed to exercise this oversight authority. In 2007, the 
Government Accountability Office testified before Congress that the Ford Class Aircraft 
Carrier was potentially underestimated by 22 percent, technologies were immature, and 
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schedules were likely to slip. These are the hallmarks of a bad business case. Despite 
these warnings, the program and its funding was approved. Today, the expected cost 
increases have occurred, technology maturation is behind schedule, and the schedule of 
the program itself has been delayed.43  
 As Congress continues to approve funding for programs based on it reinforces 
those practices instead of those based on sound acquisition and management practices. 
Rationalizations for why these programs should move forward are easily created. There 
could be an urgent threat that requires a new capability in order to deal with it, or there 
could be an industrial base in need of preservation. Perhaps the new system is still 
immature, but Congress has been assured that it is more capable then its legacy 
predecessor, and that the new systems problems will be worked out in the future.44 
Regardless of the excuse, Congress is validating these bad behaviors that lead to bad 
business cases, by approving the programs based upon those cases. 
Who Solves This Problem? 
In order for defense acquisition reform to ever been one hundred percent 
successful, these cultural issues that incentivize the forward momentum of bad business 
cases will need to be removed. However, considering that the cultural issues in the 
defense acquisition system that are causing bad business cases to be incentivized are not 
inherent to just one part of government, multiple entities will need to be involved in order 
for these issues to be properly dealt with. Removing bad incentives will require the 
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participation of the Department of Defense, multiple parts of Congress, and the 
workforce itself. 
The Department of Defense has perhaps the largest role to play in reform the 
culture of the defense acquisition workforce. While Congress authorizes and appropriates 
funding for these programs, it will be the program managers and other staff who will 
have the ground level view of these programs, and will be able to quickly flag a program 
as being a bad business case. Additionally, any changes to workforce incentives would 
need to be given oversight at the Department of Defense.  
Fortunately, the defense department is not blind to their role in this situation. 
Since 2010, The Department of Defense has been introducing the “Better Buying Power 
Initiatives,” designed to increase efficiency and reduce costs across the defense 
acquisition system. Better Buying Power 1.0 was first deployed in 2010, and Better 
Buying Power 2.0 was released in 2013. The release of both of these initiatives indicates 
that not only is the defense department aware of their acquisition issues, but they 
acknowledge that they can have a role in addressing them. Indeed, Better Buying Power 
2.0 specifically addressed the need to incentivize the workforce to make smart decisions 
based on data, and also cited the need to rethink budget decisions in order to avoid 
making a decision simply to avoid a funding reduction.45 Finally, Better Buying Power 
3.0 was initiated on April 9, 2015. The third iteration of Better Buying Power also serves 
to expand upon Better Buying Power 2.0, specifically the idea of providing better 
incentives to the defense industry.46 
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However, the defense department is also wary of losing some of its acquisition 
powers, even if it means simply distilling them down into the various component armed 
services. During the debate on the Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, 
Defense Secretary Ash Carter and Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics Frank Kendall originally opposed the proposal released by Senator John 
McCain that involved giving the service chiefs more power in the requirements setting 
process. It was not until the “most egregious” parts of the reform language were removed 
in conference did the Secretary and Under Secretary lend their support to the bill.47 
Congress will play a foundational role in whatever reform effort is under taken to 
address these cultural issues, and also in the future when considering these funding 
decisions. In order to achieve reform of the magnitude required to remove these 
incentives, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees would most likely need to 
write reform measures into a standalone piece of legislation such as the Weapons 
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, or include the provisions in the yearly National 
Defense Authorization Act.  
Additionally, should these reforms require funding to implement, the House and 
Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee’s will have to appropriate the funds 
required to proceed. Congress’s involvement in this process also has a commitment and 
long haul element to it as well. Congress’s continued willingness to authorize and 
appropriate funding for programs based on bad business decisions will need to end as 
well if we are to truly disincentivized programs based on bad business cases. 
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Finally, the defense acquisition workforce will need to not only have buy in 
regarding reform efforts, but will also need to be sufficiently empowered in whatever 
legislation is brought forth if the efforts are to succeed. A workforce that feels as though 
it is being punished for previous indiscretions, or program managers who are not given 
sufficient tools to effectively push back against the previously mentioned incentives will 
not only fail to move away from those negative incentives, but they may leave the 
workforce entirely.  
Policy Proposal 
Policy Authorization Tool 
 Utilizing the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (FY17 
NDAA), the House Armed Services Committee should propose legislation for enactment 
by Congress that creates incentives for suppliers to provide realistic cost estimates. This 
legislation will also create harsher penalties for the Department of Defense if major cost 
growth occurs while also encouraging top down promotion of accurate cost estimates.  
These incentives will need to promote responsibility in the contractors who provide 
proposals and the program sponsors who make budget requests for these programs.  
 This proposal would provide incentives using two mechanisms. First, to ensure 
costs are more realistic, the FY17 NDAA should be used to expand and codify into law a 
program that was created in Better Buying Power 3.0 (BBP3) known as the Superior 
Supplier Incentive Program (SSIP). Currently, the SSIP is designed to recognize higher-
performing industry partners based on past performance evaluations for the purposes of 
incentivizing excellent performance and fostering competition. These performance 
evaluations are based on the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System, 




responsiveness, management of key personnel, and utilization of small business.48 Each 
service maintains a SSIP specific to their needs, and this would not change under the 
expanded program. Currently, various business sectors of suppliers are individual ranked 
from Tier 1-3 depending on their performance over the past three years, with extra weight 
given to the most recent year of performance. 
Second, in order to incentivize the Department of Defense and various branches 
of the Armed Services who act as program sponsors not to accept unrealistic and 
optimistic cost estimates, the FY17 NDAA should be used to amend the Nunn-McCurdy 
to create additional penalties and oversight mechanisms that will be triggered if a Nunn-
McCurdy breach is found.  The proposal would also make Nunn-McCurdy breaches more 
difficult to override. 
Policy Implementation Tools 
 In order to incentivize accurate cost estimating by suppliers, the SSIP will be 
expanded to create a specific framework of requirements that must be met for suppliers to 
bid on various contracts.  
 Under the expanded SSIP, the basic structure of the program would remain the 
same. However, under the expanded SSIP, contractors who are in lower tiers of the SSIP 
will not be permitted to bid for larger and more complicated contracts. For example, a 
supplier who is in Tier 3 of the program will not be permitted to bid upon a larger 
Acquisition Category 1 (ACAT1) Program. These are programs that require more than 
$2.79 Billion in research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E). Suppliers who are 
in Tier 2 of the program will be permitted to bid on larger projects, but will be required to 
provide additional data on the level of technology maturation for their products, and will 
                                                          




be required to pay up to 10% of the RDT&E costs, depending on the size and assets of 
the company. Comparatively, suppliers who earn Tier 1 status will have additional 
contract options offered to them, such as cost plus incentive structure contracts. 
 The expanded SSIP program will be implemented by the individual armed 
services, all of which already have SSIP offices. As the expanded SSIP program only 
contains changes to how the various tier rankings affect a supplier’s ability to bid on a 
contract, and not to the administrative duties of the SSIP offices, it is unlikely that this 
program will have noticeable cost impacts.  
In order to ensure that program sponsors are incentivized to only accept accurate 
and reasonable cost estimates, additional amendments to the Nunn-McCurdy Act will be 
made. The Nunn-McCurdy Act is an oversight mechanism that is designed to provide 
notification to Congress for certain cost growth breaches. Under the current Nunn-
McCurdy Act legislation, if a program is found to be in a critical breach (50% over the 
current baseline for the program), the program is considered to be cancelled unless the 
Secretary of Defense sends a written explanation to Congress stipulating that the new 
program costs are reasonable and the management structures for the program are 
accurate.49Under the amended version of the Nunn-McCurdy Act envisioned here, more 
strident requirements for a program that is violating the Nunn-McCurdy Act will be 
implemented. For a program to continue once a Nunn-McCurdy breach has been found, 
the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the armed service sponsoring the program, and the 
program executive officer for the violating program will be required to appear before a 
joint hearing of the House Armed Services Committee and the House Appropriations 
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Committee’s Subcommittee on Defense. A vote will be required by the assembled 
members at this hearing to determine whether or not the program will be permitted to 
continue, or if it’s authorization will be cancelled and its funding revoked.  
Additionally, regardless of whether or not the program is allowed to continue, the 
sponsoring service will be required to pay the three percent fine into the rapid prototyping 
fund established in the FY16 NDAA. However, this provision will be further amended to 
incentivize accurate cost estimates. At the end of the Fiscal Year, the service which has 
had the least cost overages as a percentage of their total acquisition portfolio will be 
given preferential treatment in terms of requests to use the funds currently within the 
rapid prototyping and equipping fund. 
Policy Analysis 
Introduction 
 As with any policy proposal, the initiatives detailed above are not without their 
individual pros and cons. The defense acquisition system is a complex organism, and 
modifying its various component pieces inevitably causes second and third order affects 
to ripple through the system. Initiatives designed to incentivize better behaviors in order 
to change the inherent culture of the defense acquisition workforce are certainly no 
exception to the rule. 
Policy Analysis: Pros 
 The first part of this policy proposal, the expansion of the already existing 
Superior Supplier Incentive Program, contains several inherent strengths that would make 
it easier to implement than other proposals. The first strength of the expanded Superior 
Supplier Incentive Program is the fact that a multitude of larger defense contractors 




use the annual rankings to enhance their company’s reputation not just in the eyes of the 
various branches of the armed services, but also to the public and their shareholders.50 As 
a result of this acceptance, an expanded Superior Supplier Incentive Program is not likely 
to experience much backlash from contractors, especially when it contains enhanced 
incentives. Even a shallow search using internet resources reveals multiple companies 
such as Sierra Nevada Corporation, DynCorp International, and Rolls Royce issuing 
public statements after some of their business segments were ranked in Tier 1 
categories. 515253  The fact that companies have already started to appreciate what the 
Superior Supplier Incentive Program can do for them means that it is more likely that an 
expanded program, with expanded incentives, will continue to have success in promoting 
responsible business practices in suppliers, and mitigating the culture of irresponsible 
cost estimating within the defense acquisition system. Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Frank Kendall recounted a conversation he had 
with an executive of a Tier 3 Navy business in which the executive said, “We didn’t do 
very well, and now I have to explain to my board why I’m not at the top.” Secretary 
Kendall purportedly thought, “Yes. That’s what I want them to have to do.”54 
                                                          
50Sierra Nevada Corporation Ranked as "Tier 1 Superior Supplier" by the United States Air Force." Sierra 
Nevada Corporation Ranked as "Tier 1 Superi... February 27, 2015. Accessed March 09, 2016. 
http://www.sncorp.com/AboutUs/NewsDetails/877.  
51 "Sierra Nevada Corporation Ranked as "Tier 1 Superior Supplier" by the United States Air Force." Sierra 
Nevada Corporation Ranked as "Tier 1 Superi... February 27, 2015. Accessed March 09, 2016. 
http://www.sncorp.com/AboutUs/NewsDetails/877. 
52 "Inside DI." DynCorp International. July 16, 2015. Accessed March 09, 2016. http://www.dyn-
intl.com/inside-di/u-s-army-as-superior-supplier/. 
53 "Rolls-Royce Repeats as US Air Force Superior Supplier." – Rolls-Royce. September 15, 2015. 
Accessed March 09, 2016. http://www.rolls-royce.com/media/press-releases/yr-2015/pr-15a-09-2015-rolls-
royce-repeats-as-us-air-force-superior-supplier.aspx. 
54 Capaccio, Tony. "Lockheed, BAE Units Make Top List in Army, Air Force Ratings." Bloomberg.com. 





 The second strength of the expanded Superior Supplier Incentive Program comes 
from the fact that the criteria by which suppliers will be rated is not only well established, 
but the rating system itself for Tier rankings is designed to not simply look at a company 
in snapshot, but in a wider view. The Contractor Performance Assessment Rating System 
(CPARS) is a well-established component of the federal acquisition regulation system, 
and program executive offices are already well acquainted with the online reporting 
system that is used in order to submit and collate data on suppliers.55 As such, 
implementing the new expanded Superior Supplier Incentive Program is likely to occur in 
an efficient manner, as the rating system and its reporting mechanism does not require 
modifications. Additionally, as the rating system to place the various supplier business 
sectors is based on the last three years of ratings, and not just the current year, contractors 
are guaranteed an opportunity to not only build upon the previous year’s success or 
failures, but also to be judged in a more time-sensitive manner. While poor performance 
in one of the past three years will certainly have an impact upon a suppliers ranking, it 
does not necessarily mean that a supplier will slip in the tier system if it has a track record 
of excellent performance, thus incentivizing these suppliers to ensure their practices will 
be highly rated in the CPARS rankings yet again.56 
 The second part of this policy proposal, further amendments to the Nunn-
McCurdy Act, contains several of its own strengths as well. The first strength is the fact 
that Nunn-McCurdy has been proven to be effective in identifying unrealistic cost 
estimates that lead to cost growth. 
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 For over thirty years, defense department officials, analysts, and industry officials 
have drawn a link between unrealistically optimistic cost estimates at the beginning of 
program, and large cost growth later down the line.57 In 2006, the Deputy Undersecretary 
of the Air Force for Space Programs made a direct link between unrealistically optimistic 
estimates and future Nunn-McCurdy breaches. As the Deputy Undersecretary would go 
on to state in his presentation, “Understated costs leads to lower budget → leads to 
industry bidding price less than budget → leads to lower award price → leads to 
government repeatedly changing scope, schedule, budget profile → leads to five to ten 
years later recognition “real” cost multiple of bid → leads to Nunn-McCurdy Breach.”58 
This correlation between initial cost underestimates and eventual Nunn McCurdy 
breaches indicates that one strength of these Nunn McCurdy amendments will be that 
they will be based on a platform that has already proven effective in discovering overly 
optimistic cost estimates. Thus, the new consequences for Nunn McCurdy breaches 
detailed in these amendments should be perceived by contractors to have a valid trigger, 
and not one that is easily bypassed through bureaucratic measures.  
 Currently, Nunn-McCurdy violations are easy to bypass in Congress with a 
simple written explanation from the Secretary of Defense. These Nunn-McCurdy 
amendments eliminate this weakness by requiring that the Secretary of Defense and the 
Secretary and Chief of Staff for the branch of the Armed Service with a violating 
program to appear before a joint hearing of the House Armed Services Committee and 
House Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Defense. This amendment will 
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help to instill a top-down cultural shift in the practices of cost estimating in the 
Department of Defense. With the Secretary of Defense and both the Secretary and Chief 
of Staff of each Armed Service now being held responsible for potential cost overruns, 
they will be more likely to instill in their staff the need ensure that cost estimates made at 
the beginning of the program are accurate, and will not lead to a future Nunn-McCurdy 
hearing. As a subset to this strength, as a result of the various Chiefs of Staff of the armed 
services requesting additional power in determining requirements for new programs, the 
Fiscal Year 2016 NDAA reduced the power of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and provided the Chiefs of Staff with this added 
power.59 By including the Chiefs in the hearings required should a Nunn-McCurdy 
breach occur, they will each be held especially responsible for ensuring that the 
requirements they set forth at the beginning of a program are achievable, and the cost 
estimates they approve are realistic. 
In addition to these strengths, the amended Nunn-McCurdy proposal will also 
require Congress to take a more substantial role in cost overrun oversight. As mentioned 
previously in this analysis, one of the factors reinforcing the culture of programs based on 
bad business cases to continue is the fact that Congress continues to allocate money to 
these programs. By requiring Congress to hold hearings and analyze the cases of 
programs who do incur Nunn-McCurdy breaches, there will be an additional opportunity 
beyond the normal appropriation season to conduct financial oversight on programs, and 
to effectively determine if they should continue. 
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Policy Analysis: Cons 
While the current Superior Supplier Incentive Program has been viewed favorably 
by its participants, the fact remains that the program has only been in existence for three 
years. As such, it is too soon to tell if the program will have a lasting impact on the 
culture of the defense acquisition workforce. However, there are several clear 
weaknesses. 
First, neither the current Superior Supplier Incentive Program or the expanded 
version proposed here does anything to promote smaller suppliers to develop realistic 
cost estimate practices as they grow. As smaller suppliers grow and prepare to bid on 
major defense acquisition projects, they may find that it takes them many budgetary 
cycles to develop the reputation for cost control that allows them to enter into the upper 
tiers of the program. As a result, larger suppliers’ may enjoy an unfair advantage in their 
already well established position at the top, and program sponsors may feel inclined to 
choose them as a known value. As such, this program may reduce competition, and drive 
costs up in the long run. 
The largest weakness of the current Superior Supplier Incentive program and the 
expanded version is found in the Contractor Performance Assessment Rating System 
(CPARS) data that is used to actually measure the performance of suppliers, and the Past 
Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS) that is used to organize and view this 
data. While this analysis previously praised the criteria monitored in CPARS itself as 





 In 2008, a Department of Defense Inspector General Report cited numerous 
problems with the CPARS system. The report found that the online portal for CPARS did 
not contain all active contracts over $5 Million in value. The same report also noted that 
39 percent of the contracts in the CPARS were registered more than a year later, 68 
percent of the performance reports were overdue, and 82 percent of the of the past 
performance reports did not contain sufficient narratives to create creditable performance 
ratings. Considering that the expanded Superior Supplier Incentive Program relies upon 
accurate and timely past performance data to rank suppliers into their tiers, these issues 
indicate a major weakness for the current or future versions of this program.60 
Additionally, a Government Accountability Office report from 2009 indicates that 
Department of Defense contracting officials did not trust the data that was found in the 
PPIRS. As a result, these officials did not take past performance data into account when 
awarding contracts, as they felt there was uncertainty in the reliability of the data. From 
2006 to 2007, only a small percentage of PPIRS data contained key factors such as 
contract termination for default. The same report also indicated that a lack of standard 
rating factors across agencies made the PPIRS data unreliable as well.61 Any incentive 
program based on these systems may be seen to have little to no credibility as a result of 
this perceived unreliability. As a result, contracting officials may not have any faith in the 
tiered rating system if they have no faith in the data its based upon.  
Finally, research conducted in 2014 indicates that CPARS data contradicts itself. 
CPARS data contains both objective scores based on the criteria mentioned previously, 
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and narrative ratings based on these same criteria. However, when these two ratings do 
not match, preference and weight are given to the narrative ratings. This inconsistency is 
troubling in a system that is used to evaluate suppliers for contract selection.62 
 The segment of this proposal to amend the Nunn-McCurdy Act is not without its 
weaknesses either. While the Nunn-McCurdy Act has shown that it is an effective 
monitoring mechanism and reporting mechanism for cost growth, it is not an effective 
tool to use to determine if a program is showing signs of major cost growth.63  The 
amendments proposed here will not modify Nunn-McCurdy in such a way that it can act 
as a preventative measure, other than hoping that a trickledown effect from the top of the 
defense department and armed services will inspire the workforce to monitor its cost 
estimating practices. Then Under Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter reportedly stated 
that the Department of Defense requires a mechanism that is similar to Nunn-McCurdy, 
but provides insights into a program prior to significant cost growth, a mechanism “that 
gives the managerial tip-off earlier than Nunn-McCurdy.”64 While these modifications to 
Nunn-McCurdy may very well make it more difficult to validate a Nunn-McCurdy 
breach and will certainly create more Congressional oversight, they will do very little to 
change the culture of the acquisition workforce to one that avoids business cases based on 
overly optimistic cost estimates. 
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 Additionally, while these amendments will create additional Congressional 
involvement and oversight in the event of a Nunn-McCurdy breach, they do nothing to 
insure that the joint hearings proposed in these amendments will be effective. Congress 
continues to reinforce the current culture of the defense acquisition workforce every time 
it continues to authorize or appropriate funding for programs whose business cases were 
based on bad cost estimates. It does so for a variety of reasons, including parochial 
concerns such as the presence of an industry or contractor in a Congress person’s district, 
or in less savory circumstances, due to campaign contributions made to a Member of 
Congress.  
These Nunn-McCurdy amendments do nothing to ensure that the additional 
oversight of Congress during a Nunn-McCurdy breach will result in anything different 
than the current trend of allowing the program to continue with a slap on the wrist. For 
Congress to play a role in effectively changing the culture of the defense acquisition 





 This policy proposal is not without its inherent political strengths and weaknesses. 
Defense acquisition reform is rarely an issue that is tackled without any sort of 
controversy. While this proposal contains many political strengths because it is largely 
based on existing programs, its political weaknesses are not completely outweighed. 
Political Analysis: Pros  
 One of the most compelling strengths of this policy proposal is the fact that it 




a small price tag will require an offset, Congress will have an easier time potentially 
enacting this legislation as compared to a proposal with a larger price tag.  By basing the 
proposals on already existing regulations and programs, this proposal will not require 
large amounts of money for the hiring of staff, construction of offices, or development of 
rules or additional regulatory measures. While a proposal with low or no cost is always a 
good thing, given the particularly constrained budgetary situation of the federal 
government, the Department of Defense in particular, this proposal’s low cost is of 
particular benefit. While many will cite increased readiness, rapid development, or better 
capabilities as a benefit of defense acquisition reform, saving money has always been the 
linchpin, politically and policy-wise.  
 The policies outlined here will also be supported by the defense contracting 
community. Considering the fact that these companies will be the ones providing cost 
estimates to the defense department, it is crucial that they have buy in with whatever 
acquisition reforms are proposed in order to foster cooperation. As noted earlier in this 
analysis, defense contractors have already shown a particular like for the Superior 
Supplier Incentive Program in its current form. One of the few criticisms that have been 
made of the current program is that the incentives are weak. Under the current system, 
the only incentive that Tier 1 suppliers have them to themselves is the positive news 
angle. The other incentives, more favorable progress payments, priority adjudication for 
labor and indirect cost rates, and increased intervals between system reviews, are all 
universal across the tiers. Adding additional incentives to the higher tiers, as proposed in 
this policy concept, reacts directly to contractor requests.65 
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 Furthermore, this policy proposal will imbue Congress with additional power. 
These amendments to the Nunn-McCurdy Act proposed will provide the opportunity for 
a secondary review period by Congress for all programs with Nunn-McCurdy breaches. 
While Congress has this authority to some extent under the current Nunn-McCurdy 
provisions, the Secretary of Defense is able to easily write off these breaches with an 
explanation to Congress and assurances that the program is vital for national Security. By 
forcing the executives mentioned earlier to appear before Congress and validate the 
continued existence of a program, Congress will be able to provide better oversight over 
programs that have incurred Nunn-McCurdy breaches because they are based on bad 
business models. If this laws is enacted, Members on both sides of the aisle will be able 
to claim that he or she is either preserving a critical military program, or reducing the size 
of the federal deficit. Power is an excellent incentive for Congress. 
 The limited changes that will be required if these proposals are passed means that 
these policies can be implemented in an expedient fashion with limited delays and 
roadblocks along the way For example, in the case of the Superior Supplier Incentive 
Program, all four branches of the armed services under the Department of Defense have 
already stood up their own individual program offices and have released tier rankings for 
contractors. In the case of the Nunn-McCurdy act, the regulatory measures required to 




                                                                                                                                                                             






Political Analysis: Cons 
 This policy proposal is not without its weaknesses in terms of politics. Perhaps the 
greatest political weaknesses of the proposal have to do with the internal politics of 
Congress itself, and how that may affect the ability of the policy to be passed. 
 In the event that a program commits a Nunn-McCurdy breach, this policy would 
require the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the involved branch of the armed 
services, and the Chief of Staff of that same service to appear before a joint session of the 
House Armed Services Committee and House Appropriations Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Defense. While this may appear to be a comprehensive body to appear 
before, these amendments do not address the role, if any, of the authorizers and 
appropriators of the Senate side of the legislative branch. It is highly unlikely that the 
United States Senate would permit such amendments to the Nunn-McCurdy Act to 
proceed without representation from their side of the Capitol building. This could lead to 
a major conflict during conference between the House and Senate versions of the 
National Defense Authorization Act. 
 It is most likely infeasible to include the membership of both the House and 
Senate side of the authorizers and appropriators. To do so would mean holding a hearing 
with a total of 117 different members. A hearing of that size would most likely be unable 
to allow enough questions or discussion between Members and witnesses for effective 
oversight to be performed or educated decisions on the future of a program to be made. 
To rectify this issue and decrease this issue as political weakness, the proposal could be 
modified to require the joint committee session to include the Chairman and Ranking 




make the Senate more amenable to this portion of the policy proposal and increase its 
likelihood of passage by Congress. 
 The second most pressing political weakness of this policy proposal also centers 
around the role that the Congress will need to play. It remains to be seen whether or not 
additional hearings held by Congress in the event of a Nunn-McCurdy breach will 
provide effective oversight to these programs and departments. Whether or not Congress 
will have the political will to shutdown programs that are based on bad business models 
that have turned out to have overly optimistic cost estimates is a major unknown. The 
reasons for this uncertainty are primarily parochial interests for Representatives and 
Senators, and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter provides an excellent example.  
For example, The F-35 is directly responsible for 32,500 jobs across 46 states. In 
Washington State alone, the program has 13 supplier locations, $173 Million worth of 
impact, and 2.2% of the programs jobs are in Washington.66 The difficulty a 
Representative or Senator may find in voting to cancel a program with such an impact 
should not be overestimated, nor can a Congressperson be expected to ignore its potential 
impact on their state or district. 
Finally, it is possible that the Department of Defense may raise opposition to the 
new tenants of the expanded Superior Supplier Incentive Program that would restrict 
which suppliers the defense department can contract with for certain types of contracts. 
While the concept of limiting those who can bid on major defense acquisition programs 
to the contractors with the best track record may seem common sense, the defense 
department may raise concerns about limiting their ability to do business with contractors 
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who specific technical expertise. This opposition could lead to the rallying of defense 
department allies in Congress to vote against the legislation, or manifest itself further in a 
presidential veto, which occurred just last year. 
 This provision could be modified to permit the Department of Defense to accept a 
bid from a contractor outside of the required tier if the Secretary of Defense can certify to 
Congress that contractor in question is uniquely suited to produce or operate the program 
in question. This certification should be either approved or denied by the four defense 
committees, much in the same way above threshold reprogramming requests are handled 
presently. Otherwise, a certification system much like the present version of Nunn-




 No policy proposal is perfect, and the two policies described throughout this 
analysis are not without exception. The policy has several strong pros, and several strong 
cons that must be taken into consideration in comparison with each other.  
 This policy is particularly strong in terms of its costs, or in this case, the lack there 
of. The expansion of the Superior Supplier Incentive Program as described above relies 
upon already existing program offices, the proven rating criteria of the Contractor 
Performance Assessment Report System, and the established Past Performance 
Information Retrieval System. Expanding the Superior Supplier Incentive Program to 





 However, while there is no required additional funding to expand the Superior 
Supplier Incentive Program, that does not necessarily mean that funding could not be 
utilized. While CPARS and PPIRS are established, they are not without their own 
weaknesses that raise serious questions into their efficacy as a tool to evaluate suppliers 
for the selection of our major defense acquisition programs. A Department of Defense 
Inspector General report has indicated that CPARS has issues with overdue reports and 
insufficient narratives to provide context to the rating system data.67 Additionally, A 
Government Accountability Office report has indicated that data contained within PPIRS 
has been considered unreliable by Department of Defense contracting official’s due data 
such as contract termination due to default not being included, and a lack of 
standardization of criteria across agencies.68 When considering these factors, I believe 
that additional funding would be required for either training or additional oversight to 
ensure that CPARS and PPIRS are functioning at a level in which their data can be 
reliably used for contractor incentive determination. 
 This proposal displays impressive strengths in its amendments to the Nunn-
McCurdy Act as well. One of the primary reasons that systemic issues in the defense 
department that allow programs based on bad business models continue is because 
Congress, year after year, authorizes and appropriates funding for them. By amending 
Nunn-McCurdy to strengthen the current breach reporting mechanism into a joint hearing 
featuring the top three executives of the armed service branch in question, not only will a 
heavier push for realistic cost estimates trickle down from the top so that these executives 
                                                          
67 Jolliffe, Richard B. Contractor Past Performance Information. Report no. D-2008-057. Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense Inspector General, 2008. 
68 Woods, William T. "Observations on the Government’s Contracting Data Systems." Government 





avoid these hearings, but Congress will be given a second opportunity for oversight of 
these major spending programs.  
 Unfortunately, the piece of this part of the recommendation with the power to 
have the most impact, the reengagement of Congress, also has the largest unknown factor 
in terms of its success. Not with standing issues mentioned previously in terms of what 
conglomeration of Congress will actually hold these hearings, the question of whether or 
not Members of Congress will have the political will to make the hard choices and cut 
programs that may bring jobs to their district or state remains unanswered. Because of 
this uncertainty, there is no reason to believe to that giving Congress a second chance to 
revoke an authorization or appropriation will actually have a positive effect on the 
defense acquisition system, and therefore do nothing to eliminate systemic issues that 
promote unrealistic cost estimates on bad business models. 
 This policy proposal set out to fix an enormously broad and complicated problem: 
eliminate systemic issues that incentivize overly optimistic cost estimates to be made on 
bad business models. While the proposal contains many strengths, such as a low cost 
incentive program that contractors are already on board with and forcing Congress to 
reconsider the largest cost overruns, these strengths appear to be overshadowed by 
weaknesses that have occurred as a result of an overly simplistic expansion of a program, 
and Congress’s own systemic issues. It is for these reasons that I cannot recommend 
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